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Abstract 
We examine whether investor protection affects capital markets in terms of the 
development of corporate bond markets versus that of equity markets. Using a dataset of 
42 countries, we show that in countries with stronger creditor rights, corporate bond 
markets are more developed than equity markets. In opposition, we find only weak 
evidence that in countries with stronger shareholder protection, equity markets are more 
developed than corporate bond markets. Additionally, we find that the effects of financial 
reforms on capital markets are strongly dependent on the strength of investor protections 
in a given country and information disclosure.  
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1. Introduction 
In a seminal paper, La Porta et al. (1998) documented that legal origins influence a 
country’s law regarding creditor and shareholder rights, its level of bank credit and its stock 
market development. Their results indicated that equity markets are more likely to be 
developed in countries with common law origins than with civil law origins. Well-
developed equity markets, in turn, make it easier for firms to attract financing for their 
investment needs (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
Thus far, the literature has primarily concentrated on the equity market and not paid much 
attention to the development of the structure of capital markets, but corporate bond markets 
are an important part of the capital markets . According to Tendulkar and Hancock (2014) 
corporate bond markets have almost tripled in size since 2000, reaching $49 trillion in 
2013. In the wake of the financial crisis, growth has slowed down as banks have begun to 
deleverage their balance sheets, but the amount outstanding from non-financial firms has 
continued to expand. Indeed, according to the ‘spare tire view’, a financial crisis can be 
less severe if a country has the necessary legal infrastructure so that their capital market 
can provide alternative financing to firms when their banking systems cannot. Recently, 
Levine, Lin, and Xie (2015) showed that in countries with stronger shareholder protection 
laws, firms increase the volume of equity issuances in response to a systematic banking 
crisis. These findings hold particularly strongly for firms that depend heavily on external 
finance. Hence, the results suggest that shareholder protections ameliorate the adverse 
effects of banking crises by providing alternative financing through the equity market.  
In response to a banking crisis, due to its similar characteristics to bank loans, the corporate 
bond market seems to be more suitable than the equity market for firms looking for 
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alternative financing (Boyd and Smith, 1998). In addition, on average, the bond yield is 
lower than the bank interest rate for the lowest-risk borrowers, but bond issuance is limited 
to firms with large sales revenues (Russ and Valderrama, 2012). The higher marginal cost 
of bank lending is the outcome of the specialization of banks, who spend significant 
resources to acquire information and monitor borrowers. In contrast, bonds are acquired by 
a dispersed pool of investors who cannot or choose not to monitor the activities of the 
issuers and therefore are commonly also referred to as “unmonitored” lending (Russ and 
Valderrama, 2012). These differences may also explain why the corporate bond market is 
more resilient during recessions or times of financial distress than the banking sector. De 
Fiore and Uhlig (2015) showed, however, that a shift in corporate debt from bank finance 
to bonds was followed by an increasing cost of debt securities relative to bank loans during 
the financial crisis of 2007. More importantly, De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) documented that 
total bank loans behaved in a markedly procyclical manner during the financial crisis, 
whereas corporate bond markets did not. They also showed that when firms have no access 
to the bond market, the negative effects on investment and output of a shock that reduces 
bank profitability are amplified. Thus, the corporate bond market development is important 
from a macroeconomic perspective because it reduces the adverse consequences on 
economic activity of periods of financial distress. However, it remains largely unknown 
why and how corporate bond markets develop across countries. 
The following study investigates how laws and legal institutions affect the development of 
corporate bond markets relative to that of equity markets using a sample of 42 developed 
and developing countries over the period of 1978 to 2011. In the study, we employ several 
different measures as proxies for creditor and shareholder protections. We also control for 
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other legal factors, such as country legal origins, debt contract enforcement and bond 
contract covenants. The existing research indicates that these legal factors are correlated 
with financial system development, and the link remains robust after controlling for 
religious composition and other national characteristics (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003). Lastly, we investigate the effects of financial crises on the relationship 
between law and capital market development (Allen, Gu, and Kowalewski 2012). 
Our initial empirical strategy is to run cross-country regressions to determine the effects of 
creditor and shareholder rights on the development of the corporate bond market relative 
to that of the equity market. We control for macro-economic country characteristics that 
are likely to affect capital market development. We also employ a natural experiment with 
a generalized difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff, henceforth) estimator to explore 
whether financial reforms in past decades have any effect on the association between the 
law and the development of the structure of the capital market within a country. This diff-
in-diff strategy avoids the econometric concern that institutional factors such as creditor or 
shareholder rights are endogenous, and it presents an alternative to the instrumental 
variable techniques that have been criticized by Djankov et al. (2007). 
Our results support the logic underlying the finance literature and the law literature, which 
have linked investor protection to the development and structure of financial systems. First, 
we find that countries with stronger creditor rights tend to have a more developed corporate 
bond market relative to the equity market. Moreover, the results indicate that restrictive 
bond covenants, which serve as an alternative ex-post mechanism to protect the bondholder, 
are primarily negatively associated with the development of the bond market relative to 
that of the stock market. Additionally, we demonstrate that countries that have stronger 
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debt contract enforcement have a more developed bond market than stock market, but 
generally, information sharing is more helpful for equity market development. In addition, 
we find some evidence that shareholder protection predicts the development of the equity 
market relative to that of the corporate bond market. 
Second, we find that financial reforms improve the development of corporate bond markets 
more than that of equity markets in countries that have stronger creditor protections. In 
contrast, our results indicate that financial system reforms in countries with stronger 
shareholder protections enhance the development of the equity market more than that of 
the corporate bond market. The results suggest that the effect of financial reforms is 
strongly dependent on a country's legal system. For instance, in countries with stronger 
creditor protection, financial reforms play a more important role further corporate bond 
market development. Additionally, we document that greater information disclosure 
improves the effect of financial reforms on the development of capital markets. 
Third, the relationship between law and the structure of the capital market is not as 
significant during crisis periods as it is during normal periods. We find that in many 
advanced economies, the bond market develops faster than the equity market but only in 
the short term during a crisis period. Additionally, during a crisis period, we do not find 
significant evidence that indicates that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the bond 
market is developing faster than the equity market. Moreover, we find similar results for 
emerging economies. Consequently, the observed association between the legal system and 
the structure of the capital market is partly offset during a crisis period. Indeed, our results 
are in line with the findings of Allen et al. (2012), who documented significant short-term 
reversals in the development of financial system structures during a financial crisis. 
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However, they indicated that after a crisis, the financial system reverts to its previous 
structure. Thus, we also assume that after a financial crisis, the legal system still largely 
determines the structure of the capital market. 
Overall, our results document that legal factors are important in explaining the 
development of corporate bond markets versus that of equity markets across countries. We 
argue that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the corporate bond market is more 
developed than the stock market during normal periods. Moreover, the effects of financial 
reforms on the capital market development also tend to depend on the legal system, 
particularly the investor protections in the country.  
Our study contributes to the literature by filling the gap regarding the effect of laws on 
financial system development. First, in contrast to the previous studies, we use the 
corporate bond market instead of private bank credit and hence provide new insights into 
capital market development across countries. We find a strong relationship between 
creditor protection and corporate bond market development. Our results are in contrast to 
those of Musacchio (2008), who employed data for Brazil from 1885 to 2003 and found 
no stable relationship between creditor protections and bond market development in the 
long run. In our study, however, we use a large dataset of countries, and consequently, the 
results are more general. Second, Allen et al. (2012) demonstrated that the corporate bond 
market moves in the same direction as bank credit and experiences a short-term reversal 
with the stock market during a crisis. However, they concentrated only on the structure of 
the financial system, whereas we present the effects of crises only on the structure of capital 
markets.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we consider the literature 
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that indicates a link between legal origins and corporate bond market development. In 
Section 3, we describe our data, and in Section 4, we present the methodology and the 
results. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Motivation 
Several related strands of literature are reviewed here. To begin, we present a short review 
of the large body of empirical research on the effects of legal origins on financial system 
development. Next, we briefly discuss the papers that have linked financial reforms with 
financial system development. Finally, we present the empirical literature that has 
investigated the relationships between financial disclosure and financial system 
development. 
La Porta et al. (1998) differentiated countries with corporate law derived from legal origins 
in England, France, Germany, and Scandinavia. They showed that countries with English 
common law and French civil law origins lie at the extremes; that is, countries with an 
English origin (French origin) provide the strongest (weakest) legal protections to both 
shareholders and creditors. Using this distinction, La Porta et al. (1998) found a positive 
relation between shareholder protection and stock market financing, and they found a 
similar effect for creditor protection on the ratio of debt over GNP. In line with their results, 
Ergungor (2004) showed that legal tradition determines the structure of a financial system, 
whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) found that countries with strong protection for 
shareholder rights tend to have a more market-based financial system. Djankov et al. (2008) 
confirmed the previous findings and linked the shareholder protection with the stock 
market development. 
In contrast, Levine (1999) found that financial intermediaries develop more in countries 
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with legal systems that assign a higher priority to creditor rights. More recently, Djankov, 
Mcliesh, and Shleifer (2007), using data for 129 countries, showed that better creditor 
rights are associated with a higher ratio of private credit to GDP. Additionally, they 
reported that ratio of private credit to GDP rises following improvements in creditor rights, 
but they found little convergence in the scores of creditor rights among legal origins over 
a 25-year period. In contrast, Musacchio (2008) did not find a strong relationship between 
creditor protection and bond market development in Brazil. He argued that creditor rights 
are a necessary condition for bond market development, but the market’s further 
development is more influenced by international capital flows and macroeconomic stability 
than legal variables. Consequently, the existing empirical evidence on the relationship 
between creditor rights and bond markets is limited and ambiguous.  
Hypothesis 1: In countries with stronger creditor rights, corporate bond markets are more 
developed than equity markets.  
Abiad and Mody (2005) documented that financial reforms advanced despite stops and 
reversals in the last quarter century. Moreover, they found that when initial reforms 
occurred, the financial sector became only partially repressed, and the likelihood of further 
reforms increased substantially. They used as an example Japan, where financial 
liberalization that aimed to develop the government bond market created demand for 
reduced restrictions on the corporate bond market. Consequently, the financial reforms in 
those years induced the development of the corporate bond market in Japan. 
Financial reforms often consist of the removal of administrative controls that restrain credit 
growth, which can in turn result in a lending boom. Tornell and Westermann (2002) 
confirmed that financial liberalization is followed by a lending boom, but they also reported 
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that sometimes, the boom ends in twin currency and a banking crisis. Notably, the lending 
boom usually ends with ‘a soft landing’, whereby credit gradually decelerates. Moreover, 
the authors argued that the financial flows that take place after financial liberalization do 
not do so through equity or bond markets because there are severe enforceability problems. 
Thus, the previous results of analyzing the effects of financial reforms on capital market 
development are ambiguous. 
Hypothesis 2: Financial system reforms enhance corporate bond market development in 
countries with stronger creditor rights. 
In the pure adverse selection model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), information 
sharing improves the pool of borrowers, decreases defaults and reduces the average interest 
rate. Hence, information sharing can improve the functioning of the market and increase 
the volume of lending. Levine (1999) found a strong positive link between financial 
intermediary development and information disclosure, whereas the relationship was 
weaker than that for creditor rights. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) showed that bank lending 
is approximately twice as large in countries where lenders share information. Thus, 
previous results show that information disclosure matters, and we assume in addition that 
it may influence the effects of financial reforms. In line with our second hypothesis, we 
expect that in countries with stronger creditor rights and better information disclosure, 
further institutional reforms in the securities market should significantly improve corporate 
bond market development. In formulating this hypothesis, we assume that investor 
protections and information theories serve as substitution mechanisms for market 
development (Djankov, Mcliesh, and Shleifer (2007); that is, both ex ante or interim better 
information sharing and ex post stronger creditor rights or shareholder rights can help 
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reduce market friction and contribute to the development of bond markets or equity markets. 
Hypothesis 3: Better information disclosure improves the effectiveness of institutional 
reforms on securities markets.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We construct the indicators of the development of corporate bond and equity markets using 
the revised financial structure dataset of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). The 
legal origin variables and the variables to control for creditor rights and shareholder rights 
are based on La Porta et al. (1998), and we use various sources to collect them. We control 
for bond covenant, information disclosure and debt contract enforcement using the data of 
Abiad and Mody (2005). We employ the data for the set of control variables for financial 
reforms from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010). Lastly, we use the data from Laeven 
and Valencia (2013) to control for systemic banking crises. Because there is limited overlap 
between the datasets, we end up with a total of 42 developed and developing countries over 
the sample period of 1978 to 2011. All variables and its sources are presented in Table A1 
in the Appendix. 
3.1 Variable definitions 
3.1.1 Corporate bond market and equity market development 
The dependent variable Structure is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to 
equity market capitalization. Both variables measure the size of the market, and their 
relationship presents the structure of the capital market in a country. To measure 
robustness, we use an alternative dependent variable, StructureTotal, which is the ratio of 
the market value of the private and public bond market to the equity market. Replicating 
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our regressions using the alternative dependent variable, which also takes into account the 
bonds issued by public entities, yields minor differences and is only shortly discussed in 
the following section for brevity.  
3.1.2 Legal determinants 
We assume that countries' level of creditor protection may determine corporate bond 
market development. We use the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) as a proxy 
for country-level bondholder protection. The index, which ranges from zero (weak) to four 
(strong), measures the number of laws and regulations that limit expropriation from secured 
creditors in a country. This index has been demonstrated to be remarkably stable over time 
and relevant in explaining patterns in total capital market development (Miller and Reisel, 
2012).  
Creditor rights are an ex-post mechanism that protects bondholders upon firm defaults. 
Therefore, we control additionally for restrictive covenants that limit the actions of the 
managers prior to defaults and serve as ex-ante mechanisms to protect creditors. Miller and 
Reisel (2012) argued that bond contracts are more likely to include restrictive covenants in 
countries with weak creditor protection. Hence, both bond covenants and creditor rights 
contribute to investor protection and can be substitutes at the country level. Following 
Miller and Reisel (2012), we proxy for bond covenants using the average number of 
covenants attached to corporate bond contracts issued by non-U.S. firms. The proxy 
reflects covenants in three categories: restrictions on financing activities, restrictions on 
investment activities and restrictions on payouts. The total possible number of covenants 
ranges between 0 and 13.  
Djankov et al. (2008) documented that the efficiency of debt enforcement is an 
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economically and statistically significant predictor of the development of debt markets 
across countries. We control for it by employing the variable debt enforcement, which 
measures of the number of days it takes to enforce a debt contract.  
In contrast, shareholder protection may result in equity market development. We control 
for shareholder protection using three different proxies: anti-director rights, anti-self-
dealing and anti-takeover provisions. The anti-director rights index (ADRI) of La Porta et 
al. (1998) aggregates six dimensions of shareholder protection rules. Of the six components, 
three are concerned with shareholder voting, including voting by mail, voting without 
blocking shares and calling an extraordinary meeting; the others are concerned with 
minority protection, including proportional board representation, preemptive rights and 
judicial remedies. Pagano and Volpin (2005), however, criticized the ADRI for its ad hoc 
nature and mistakes in coding. In response, Djankov et al. (2008) provided a revised ADRI, 
which was better theoretically grounded and more reliably weighted for 72 countries. The 
results indicated that the correlation between the original and revised ADRI was only 0.60. 
Spamann (2010) further improved the index involving leading local lawyers and provided 
a corrected ADRI for forty-six countries. The corrected ADRI differed substantially from 
the original ADRI (ρ=0.53) and the revised ADRI (ρ=0.67). Spamann (2010) demonstrated 
that many empirical results established using the original index may not be replicable with 
the corrected ADRI. In particular, the corrected index failed to support the earlier findings 
that shareholder protection is stronger in common law countries than in civil law countries. 
Therefore, we use the revised ADRI and the corrected ADRI to control for the index’s 
potential limitations in the study. 
Djankov et al. (2008) introduced a new measure of legal protection of minority 
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shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders, called the Anti-self-dealing index. 
The index covers both ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms that can limit anti-self-dealing 
transactions, including disclosure and approval by minority shareholders, independent 
review and standing to sue. Although both the ADRI and Anti-self-dealing index capture 
the strength of shareholder rights, there are still significant differences between them. 
Djankov et al. (2008) indicated that anti-director rights is the central problem of corporate 
governance in many countries compared to self-dealing. Thus, they suggested that in 
general, anti-self-dealing is preferable to the ADRI in cross-county studies. Additionally, 
the empirical evidence indicates that the Anti-self-dealing index is a more robust predictor 
of stock market development than the ADRI. 
We also use the Anti-takeover index developed by Nenova (2006), which captures the set 
of rules and regulations concerned with changes in corporate control, takeovers, tender 
offers and general acquisition activity across countries. Nenova (2006) showed that good 
takeover laws positively affect the number of listed companies, market capitalization, and 
value traded on stock exchanges, controlling for to the general level of national economic 
growth.  
The empirical literature also suggests that legal origin may matter for creditor rights and 
shareholder protections (La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, we control for the legal origin 
and employ the dummy variable L_English, which equals one if the country has a legal 
origin of English common law and zero otherwise. Dummy variables for countries with 
French (L_French) and German civil law origins (L_German) are constructed identically. 
However, the few countries with a Scandinavian civil law origin (L_Scandinavian) are 
captured in the regressions by the constant.  
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3.1.3 Information disclosure and financial reforms 
Better information disclosure contributes to credit market development (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2002). La Porta et al. (2006) documented that the development of stock markets 
is strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements. The Center for Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR) created an index by rating the annual reports on the 
inclusion or omission of 90 items, which we employ to control for the level of information 
disclosure across countries. 
The data on financial reforms come from the dataset of Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel 
(2010). Their database comes with several indices related to specific financial reforms plus 
an aggregate index. The financial reform index is a sum of seven different dimensions: 
credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state 
ownership in the banking sector, capital account restrictions, prudential regulations, and 
supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policy. For each dimension, a 
country is given a score graded from 0 (high repression) to 3 (full liberalization); thus, the 
index takes values between 0 and 21. We employ a dummy financial reforms, which equals 
1 if the first difference of the index is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable 
controls for the year when there are policy changes in a country, whereas the values of the 
index are stable for the majority of normal years. 
3.1.4 Banking crisis 
In a systemic banking crisis, non-performing loans increase dramatically, and much of the 
aggregate banking system capital is shortly exhausted. As a result, a systematic banking 
crisis always leads to output losses in the economy. We use the starting dates of systemic 
banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2013), and we focus on those crises with 
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an output loss of over 10%. We assume that only a large systematic banking crisis might 
lead to significant capital market development. Using this criterion, we are able to identify 
144 systemic banking crises across countries. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In Panel A of Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics. Variation in the capital market 
measures across countries is noticeable The variable Structure exhibits high cross-sectional 
variability, ranging from 0.00 to 5.68 with a mean of 1.44, which indicates that compared 
to stock market development, there are huge differences with corporate bond market 
development across countries. The alterative variable StructureTotal, which is defined as the 
development of the public to private bond market versus the stock market, exhibits even 
higher variation, ranging from 0.00 to 5.68 with a mean of 0.58.  
The variable Structure identifies Iceland, Ireland, Denmark, Austria and Italy as having, 
on average, the highest market capitalization of the corporate bond market relative to the 
equity market from 2007-2011. Conversely, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Luxembourg, 
Columbia, and Turkey have the lowest ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to 
stock market capitalization in the five years. When we include the public bond market, the 
highest average ratios of bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization are 
reported Italy, the Slovak Republic, Iceland, Austria and Ireland, and the lowest are 
reported for Chile, Switzerland, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Luxembourg for the last 
five years. 
The independent variables exhibit high cross-sectional variation, whereas the variable 
Creditor rights ranges from 0 to 4, with an average of 1.80. The value indicates that 
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countries in our sample provide, on average, low protection to creditors. The results are 
strengthened by the revised ADRI and corrected ADRI, with average values of 3.37 and 
3.74, respectively. The Anti-self-dealing index has an average of 0.44, and its scores range 
from 0.08 to 1.00. The Anti-takeover index has an average of 0.46, and the scores range 
from 0.04 to 0.97. 
Panel B in Table 1 presents a matrix of the correlation between explanatory variables and 
the proxies for investor protection and the control variables. As expected, the two 
regressors Structure and StructureTotal that proxy for bond market development are highly 
correlated. The variable Creditor rights is significantly and positively related to the 
variable Structure. In contrast, it is insignificantly related to StructureTotal. Hence, the 
results indicate that creditor protection is important for the development of corporate bond 
markets. In contrast, we may assume that public bond market development is driven more 
by fiscal and monetary credibility. In line with our expectations, the variable Anti-takeover 
index, which proxies for shareholder protection, is significantly and negatively correlated 
with the variable Structure and its alternative. The results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that stronger creditor rights are positively associated with the higher 
development of the corporate bond market relative to the equity market, whereas stronger 
shareholder protection has a negative effect on the development of the corporate bond 
market versus that of the stock market.  
Panel B in Table 1 shows a positive correlation between creditor rights and shareholder 
rights. This finding is not surprising; usually, countries with well-developed legal systems 
and institutions provide similar protections to shareholders and creditors. Indeed, we find 
that a English legal origin is significantly and positively associated with both creditor rights 
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and shareholder rights, whereas a French legal origin exhibits completely opposite 
correlations. A German legal origin indicates significantly positive correlations with 
creditor rights but mixed associations with shareholder rights. These results are in line with 
those of La Porta et al. (1998), who showed that all legal families provide roughly the same 
protections to creditors and shareholders. Our results also confirm that countries with an 
English legal origin give both shareholders and creditors the strongest protection; French 
civil law countries, the weakest. The only exception is German civil law countries, which 
are more protective of creditors than shareholders.  
The variables Bond covenant and Enforcement exhibit significantly negative associations 
with the variable Structure and significantly negative correlations with creditor rights. 
Hence, the results confirm that corporate bond contracts are more likely to include 
covenants in countries with weak creditor rights, which we assume would negatively affect 
the bond market development. Moreover, debt enforcement shows not only a negative 
association with bond market development but also a positive relationship with shareholder 
and creditor protection. 
 [Table 2] 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Baseline model 
We begin our analysis by employing random effects estimates using generalized least 
squares to explore the influence of creditor rights and shareholder rights on the structure of 
the capital market. 
ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧  
(1) 
 
 
18 
 
where ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௜,௧  is the market value of the bond market to the stock market. 
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧  and ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧denote the set of variables proxying for 
creditor and shareholder protection, respectively. ௜ܺ,௧ denotes the set of control variables, 
which include legal origins, bond covenants, information disclosure, and variables of the 
macroeconomic environment, such as the log of GDP, the log of GDP per capita, and 
inflation. Variables ߙ௜ and ߚ௧ are country and year fixed effects, ߝ௜,௧ is the error term, and 
i and t denote country and time period, respectively. 
Random-effects estimates are more efficient than pooled OLS estimates and assume that 
country effects are uncorrelated with regressors, whereas fixed-effects models allow 
country effects to be correlated with regressors. Therefore, we employ both estimation 
methods for the panel regressions to establish the effect of creditor rights on corporate bond 
market development. Although the variables of interest, such as creditor and shareholder 
protection, change over time, they are characterized by variations that are not sufficiently 
sizable to be significant. Fixed-effects estimation requires significant within-group 
variations in the independent variable to generate a consistent and efficient estimator 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, the fixed-effects estimator is prone to yielding imprecise 
coefficients for variables representing creditor and shareholder rights. Moreover, fixed 
effects can aggravate the problem of multicollinearity (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore, we prefer 
and report primarily the results of the random-effects method for brevity 2 . In all 
regressions, the independent variables are jointly significant at levels below 1%. Thus, we 
do not comment further on these aspects. 
                                                            
2 For brevity, we do not report the results for the fixed-effects estimations, but they are available upon request. 
The results based on fixed-effects estimators are similar to those obtained using random-effects estimators. 
 
 
19 
 
 
4.2 Baseline results 
Table 2 presents the results of the random-effects estimations. In specifications (1)-(4), we 
regress the explanatory variable Structure against the variable Creditor rights and then 
progressively change the extensive set of variables controlling for shareholder protections. 
To check the robustness of our results in specifications (5)-(8), we repeat the estimation 
using the alternative regressor StructureTotal, which additionally includes the government 
bond market. In all regressions, we include macroeconomic control variables, such as the 
log of GDP, the log of GDP per capita and inflation. The exogenous macroeconomic 
situations of the country may determine the growth of the corporate bond market and the 
stock market.  
The regressions reveal that creditor rights are positively correlated to the bond market 
development, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. Adding proxies for shareholder protections hardly changes the coefficient 
for the variable Creditor rights. In terms of economic magnitude, specification (1) implies 
that the increase in the creditor rights index by one point results in the increase in the market 
capitalization of the corporate bond market relative to the equity market by 0.33%. This 
result implies that in countries where creditor rights are protected, represented by the higher 
value of the index, corporate bond markets are more developed. This finding is in 
accordance with Hypothesis 1. 
In Table 2, the coefficients for the different variables reflecting shareholder rights are 
negative and statistically significant in almost all specifications. The results imply that 
better shareholder protection results in the development of the equity market relative to the 
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corporate bond market. When examine the results in more detail, we find confirmation of 
the differences between the different shareholder rights indices, including the two anti-
director rights indexes. We find that the anti-takeover provisions are weak predictors of the 
development of the equity market because the coefficient for the variable Anti-takeover is 
statistically significant at only the 10% level, whereas it is insignificant when we use the 
alternative explanatory variable StructureTotal. Hence, it seems that the corrected ADRI and 
revised ADRI are better predictors of the development of the equity market relative to that 
of the bond market, whereas both of them increase their prediction power when the 
government bond market is used. However, only the coefficient for the Anti-self-dealing 
index is statistically significant at the 1% level in both specifications. Therefore, the 
variable seems to be the best predictor of equity market development. The results support 
the findings of Djankov et al. (2008), who also reported that the Anti-self-dealing index is 
a more robust predictor than the Anti-director rights index. The control variables included 
in the regressions are signed as expected in general terms but are insignificant. Adding 
control variables hardly changes the coefficients of Creditor rights or the proxies for 
shareholder protections. 
 [Table 2] 
In Table 3, we present the results and control for legal origins and other factors that may 
determine corporate bond market development. In columns (1) to (4), we control for 
countries legal origins. Adding new control variables does not change the coefficient for 
Creditor rights, which remains statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the 
coefficients for the proxies for shareholder protection have the expected sign but lose 
statistical significance. Only the coefficient for the Anti-self-dealing index is statistically 
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significant at the 5% level.  
All coefficients for legal origins are negative, but only for English common law are the 
coefficients statistically significant in almost all specifications. In contrast, the coefficients 
for German or French civil law are almost never significant or are significant at only the 
10% level. On one hand, the results confirm the finding of La Porta et al. (1998) that 
investor protection varies systematically across legal origins but is higher in common law 
than in civil law countries. However, the negative coefficients for all legal origin dummies 
suggest that all legal families more strongly protect shareholders than creditors. In fact, the 
results are in line with Djankov et al. (2008), who did not find a significant influence of 
legal origin on private credit.  
Next, we add variables that control for the restrictive bond covenant, information 
disclosure, and log of days of debt contract enforcement in the regressions. The results are 
presented in columns (5) to (8). Surprisingly, none of the control variables is significantly 
related to corporate bond market development. However, the coefficient for Creditor rights 
barely changes after the new control variables are added, indicating that the additional 
variables do not contain information, which affects corporate bond market development. 
In contrast, all proxies for shareholder protection lose significance. We thus conclude that 
creditor rights are more robust predictors of corporate bond market development than 
shareholder protections for equity markets. Overall, we find strong support for Hypothesis 
1, which states that in countries with stronger creditor rights, corporate bond markets are 
more developed than equity markets. 
[Table 3] 
4.2 Financial reforms and corporate bond market development  
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We use a natural experiment using a diff-in-diff estimator to investigate the effect of 
financial reforms on the relationship between legal determinants and corporate bond 
market development. This methodology basically compares the effect of an event (a 
financial policy change in our setting) on groups that are more affected by policy changes 
(i.e., the treated group) with those that are less affected by the changes (i.e., the control 
group). We assume that financial reforms have a stronger effect on the development of 
corporate bond markets than that of equity markets in countries with a higher creditor 
protection (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, we classify countries based on the pre-treatment level 
of creditor rights relative to shareholder rights. Countries are classified as treated groups 
when, based on the ratio, they are in the top third of the sample, and they are classified as 
control groups when they are in the bottom third of the sample. Using this methodology, 
we employ the following specification: 
ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߪ ∙ ܶݎ݁ܽݐ݁݀ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ_ݎ݂݁݋ݎ݉ ൅ ߛ ∙ ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧
൅ ߜ ∙ ݄ܵܽݎ݄݁݋݈݀݁ݎ	ݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߠ ∙ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	
                                                 (2) 
where Treated equals 1 if the country is in a treated group and 0 otherwise; Post reform is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in first year after a financial reform and zero 
otherwise. The diff-in-diff effect is captured by σ because we do not separately add the 
dummy Post reform as an independent variable. Separately, the dummy variable will be 
collinear with the year fixed-effects, and therefore, the estimates on Post reform will simply 
be random intercepts with no meanings (Gormley and Matsa, 2014).  
Table 4 presents the effects of financial reform on the association between investor 
protection and corporate bond market development. We find that adding a diff-in-diff 
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estimator does not change the main results presented in Table 3. The relationship between 
creditor and shareholder protections and capital market development remains statistically 
significant, and the signs of the coefficients do not change. However, when we use the 
fixed-effects estimations, the coefficient for Corrected ADR loses significance, whereas 
that of creditor protection remains unchanged. Consequently, the results once again 
indicate that creditor protections are more important for corporate bond market 
development than shareholder protection for the equity market.   
In all specifications, the coefficient for the interaction term Treated*Post_reform is 
positively related to corporate bond market development and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level, which indicates that in countries with stronger creditor protection than 
shareholder protection, financial reforms improve the corporate bond market development 
relative to the equity market. Consequently, we find support for our second hypothesis, 
which states that financial reforms promote corporate bond market development if the 
countries have stronger creditor rights.  
We test the sensitivity of our results by introducing an interaction term between 
information disclosure and financial reform. The coefficient for the interaction term is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, which indicates that in countries with better 
information disclosure, the effects of financial reforms are more significant for corporate 
bond market development (Hypothesis 3).   
[Table 4] 
In Table 5, we further analyze the robustness of our results by adding an interaction term 
between the legal variables and the Post reform dummy. In columns (1)-(3), we interact 
the Post reform dummy with the proxies for investor protection. The coefficient for the 
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interaction term with Creditor rights is positive and significant in all specifications. In 
contrast, the coefficient for the interaction term with the proxies for shareholder rights is 
negative but significant only for the variable Anti-self-dealing. Overall, the results show 
that after financial reforms, the relations between legal determinants and capital market 
development do not change. Stronger creditor protection is a good predictor of corporate 
bond market development, whereas stronger shareholder protection is a good predictor of 
equity market development. However, once again, the results show that among the proxies 
for shareholder protection, the variable Anti-self-dealing is the best predictor of equity 
market development.   
In columns (4)-(6), we add a triple interaction, including investor protection, a post reform 
dummy and information disclosure. We assume that there may exist cross-sectional 
heterogeneity among countries, such as information disclosure systems or other related 
regulatory and supervisory factors. We therefore expect that in countries with better 
information disclosure, the effects of financial reform may be more significant (Hypothesis 
3). The results confirm our hypothesis: The coefficients for interaction terms that include 
Creditor rights are positive and significant in all specifications. In opposition, the 
coefficients for interaction terms that include the proxies for shareholder protection are 
negative and statistically significant only for the variables Revised ADRI and Anti-self-
dealing. On one hand, the results indicate that financial reforms are more effective in 
countries with better information sharing. On the other hand, the results also show that 
information sharing is important only in countries characterized by high investor protection 
because the coefficient for Information disclosure was insignificant in Table 3.  
Lastly, in all specifications, the coefficient creditor protections remains positively related 
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to corporate bond market development and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the coefficients for the proxies for shareholder protection are negative and 
statistically significant. Consequently, the results confirm once again that investor 
protections are important for the capital market development.  
 [Table 5] 
4.3 Development of the corporate bond market during a banking crisis 
According to the spare tire view, the capital market may provide financing during a banking 
crisis. We therefore assume that in countries with higher creditor protection, corporate 
bond markets are more likely to develop during a banking crisis and thus act as a ‘spare 
tire’. Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee (2006) showed that in 1997, the severe currency crisis 
triggered a freeze in newly increased bank lending in South Korea; as a result, the corporate 
bond market sprang to life. One year later, the Korean bond market provided almost all 
funds raised by companies, whereas the surge in new issues was financed by household 
savings and the drawing down of bank deposits. Recently, Levine, Lin, and Xie (2015) 
documented that stronger shareholder protection facilitate equity financing during a 
banking crisis. These findings indicate that stronger investor protections may predict 
capital market development following a systemic banking crisis. 
In Table 7, we evaluate the spare tire view and include the dummy variable Banking crisis. 
The coefficient for the dummy variable is positive and significant in all specifications. 
Hence, the results suggest that corporate bond markets develop during a banking crisis. 
However, the key explanatory variable is the interaction term between the crisis dummy 
and the measure of the strength of investor protections. In Table 7, the coefficient for the 
interaction term between the Banking crisis and Creditor rights is positive but insignificant. 
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Consequently, we do not find evidence that corporate bond markets are developing faster 
in countries with good pre-crisis creditor protection during a systematic banking crisis. 
Similarly, in columns (2) and (4), the coefficients for the interaction terms that include the 
revised and corrected ADRI are insignificant. In all specifications that include shareholder 
protections, only the interaction term that includes the variable Anti-self-dealing enters 
with a negative and statistically significant sign at the 10% level. We thus find weak 
evidence that pre-crisis anti-self-dealing protection is positively related to equity market 
development during a systematic banking crisis. These findings are consistent with those 
of Levine, Lin, and Xie (2015), who also used the anti-self-dealing index in their study.  
[Table 6] 
To examine the sensitivity of our results, we control for the economic development of the 
countries or regions. The results are shown in Table 6. For instance, in columns (1)-(2), we 
introduce the dummy variable Advanced, which takes the value of 1 if a country has a GDP 
per capita over 10,000 USD. We employ this dummy because there were more systematic 
banking crises in emerging markets than in developed countries from 1978-2011. 
Moreover, we assume that the capital markets may behave differently in advanced 
economies than in emerging countries during a systematic banking crisis.   
Next, we interact the dummy variable with the variable Banking crisis and the proxies for 
investor protection. In column (1), the coefficient for the interaction term Region*Banking 
crisis is significant and positive, whereas in column (2), it loses significance. Hence, we 
find only weak evidence that corporate bond markets develop faster in advanced economies 
than in emerging markets during a banking crisis. We employ also a triple interaction term 
that includes the proxies for investor protections. Only the coefficient for the interaction 
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term that includes the variable Revised ADRI is statistically significant and negative in 
specification (1). The results indicate that pre-crisis shareholder protection proxied by the 
revised ADRI may predict equity market development during a systematic banking crisis.  
Next, we decide to evaluate whether there are differences in the results depending on the 
region of the crisis and its frequency. In columns (3)-(4), the variable Region controls for 
the Asian crisis of 19973, whereas in columns (5)-(6), the variable Region controls for the 
frequent systematic banking crises in Latin America from 1978-20114. In contrast to our 
expectations, we find that in none of the specifications is the coefficient for the interaction 
between the variables Region and Banking crisis significant. Moreover, we find that none 
of the coefficients for the triple interaction term that includes the proxies for investor 
protection is significant. The results indicate that in neither of the regions are creditor or 
shareholder rights determined by capital market development during a crisis. The results 
support the findings of Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee (2006), who showed that in Korea, 
the corporate bond market was growing during the Asian crisis, but it was not determined 
by the prevailing institutions. As a result, they showed that the allocation of the newly 
issued bonds was highly concentrated, and the credit screening was poor during the crisis 
in Korea.  
[Table 10] 
Figures 1 graphically presents the development of the corporate bond market relative to 
that of the equity market in all sample countries, the advanced economies and the two 
regions. We can see that on average, the corporate bond market starts to grow one year 
                                                            
3 The dummy variable controls for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore, which experienced a severe crisis from 1997 to 1998. 
4 The dummy variable controls for systematic banking crisis in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico and 
Peru from 1970-2011. 
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prior to the systematic banking crisis in the years of 1970-2011. The corporate bond 
33market expands during a crisis but starts to decline relatively to the equity market after 
the crisis. The results are consistent with those of Allen, Gu, and Kowalewski (2012), who 
showed that following a crisis, changes in the structure of the financial system are only 
short-term effects. In our sample, only the corporate bond market in Latin American 
countries is steadily growing relatively to the equity market, whereas the crisis period does 
not seem to influence its development. 
[Figure 1] 
5 Conclusions 
We examine whether investor protection determines the development of the corporate bond 
market relative to that of the equity market. On one hand, we find that countries’ level of 
creditor rights predicts corporate bond market development. On the other hand, the results 
also show that shareholder rights positively influence equity market development.  
Moreover, our results show that financial reforms may predict corporate bond market 
development in countries with stronger creditor protections. Last but not the least, we find 
that the corporate bond market develops in response to systemic banking crises. However, 
the growth is only short term because it is not determined by the level of pre-crisis creditor 
rights. In our opinion, these results indicate how investor protection affects capital market 
development and present an explanation of why some countries have a more developed 
corporate bond market than equity market.  
Our study fills a gap in the current literature on presenting the relationship between law 
and corporate bond market development. However, in this paper, we do not discuss the 
tradeoff between the improvement of creditor rights and shareholder rights. It would be 
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interesting to investigate the optimal structure of country capital markets related to long-
term economic growth. We are aware of these shortcomings, but we leave these topics for 
further research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Definitions of the main variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Financial Structure 
Structure The ratio of private bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Beck et al. (2001, 
2010); Cihak, M. et al. 
(2012) 
 StructureTotal The ratio of bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Law 
Creditor rights  An index aggregating creditor 
rights. The index ranges from 0 
(weakest creditor rights) to 4 
(strongest creditor rights) 
Djankov, S. et al. (2007)
Revised ADRI A revised index of the original 
anti-director rights index, which 
aggregates shareholder 
protection in over one hundred 
articles, including shareholder 
voting and minority protection 
LLSV (1998) 
DLLS (2008) 
Corrected ADRI A corrected index of the original 
anti-director rights index, with 
improved data collection, coding 
and documentation 
Spamann (2010) 
Anti-self-dealing An index summarizing the 
strength of minority shareholders 
in limiting expropriation by 
corporate insiders 
DLLS (2008) 
Anti-takeover 
provisions 
An index measuring the extent of 
anti-takeover regulations across 
countries 
Nenova (2006) 
Bond covenant  An index aggregating 
heterogeneous rights attached to 
bonds 
Miller. D. and N. Reisel. 
(2012) 
Information disclosure  An index created by examining 
and rating companies' annual 
reports on their inclusion or 
omission on 90 items, with a 
higher number indicating more 
disclosure. 
International 
Accounting and 
Auditing Trends, Center 
for Financial Analysis 
and Research  
Debt enforcement Equals the logarithm of the 
number of days to resolve a 
payment dispute through courts  
Djankov, S. (2008) 
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Financial Reforms 
Financial reforms An index of financial reforms, 
normalized to be between 0 and 
1 
 
 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Reform Dummy=1 if the 1st difference 
term of financial reform index is 
higher than 0 
Crises 
Banking crises A dummy variable that equals 1 
during a severe systematic 
banking crisis and zero 
otherwise. 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) 
Macroeconomic control variables 
GDP  Logarithm of gross national 
product (current US dollars) 
World Development 
Indicators 
GDP per capita Logarithm of gross national 
product per capita 
World Development 
Indicators 
Inflation Annual growth rate of consumer 
price index 
World Development 
Indicators 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Structur
e 
ܵݐݎݑݐݑݎ்݁௢௧௔௟ Credito
r rights 
Revise
d ADR 
Correct
ed ADR 
Anti-
self-
dealing 
Anti-
takeover 
L_Englis
h 
L_Frenc
h 
L_Germa
n 
Bond 
covena
nt 
Informatio
n 
disclosure 
Enforceme
nt 
Financi
al 
reform 
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 0.58 1.44 1.80 3.37 3.74 0.44 0.46 0.27 0.48 0.13 2.50 71.62 5.79 0.49 
Std. Dev. 0.75 1.45 1.18 1.13 0.95 0.23 0.24 0.45 0.50 0.33 2.38 8.07 0.65 0.30 
Min. 0.00 0.01 0 1 2 0.08 0.04 0 0 0 0 56 3.30 0 
Max. 5.68 9.52 4 5 6 1 0.97 1 1 1 7 85 7.29 1 
Obs. 856 856 4,080 3,692 2,340 3,692 2,496 6,812 6,812 6,812 2,444 1,924 6,708 2,539 
 Panel B: Correlations 
Structure 1              
ܵݐݎݑݐݑݎ்݁௢௧௔௟ 0.79* (0.00)
1             
Creditor 
rights 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.77) 1            
Revised 
ADRI 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
-0.29* 
(0.00) 
0.20* 
(0.00) 1           
Corrected 
ADRI 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
-0.22* 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.69* 
(0.00) 1          
Anti-self-
dealing 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
-0.33* 
(0.00) 
0.30* 
(0.00) 
0.56* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 1         
Anti-
takeover 
0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.34* 
(0.00) 
0.49* 
(0.00) 
0.37* 
(0.00) 
0.51* 
(0.00) 1        
L_English -0.22* (0.00) 
-0.32* 
(0.00 
0.30* 
(0.00) 
0.48* 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.60* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 1       
L_French -0.12* (0.00) 
0.10* 
(0.00) 
-
0.41* 
(0.00) 
-
0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.28* 
(0.00) 
-0.39* 
(0.00) 
-0.41* 
(0.00) 
-0.59* 
(0.00) 1      
L_German 0.14* (0.00) 
0.16* 
(0.00) 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
-
0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.12* 
(0.00) 
-0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.19* 
(0.00) 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
-0.37* 
(0.00) 1     
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Bond 
covenant 
-0.39* 
(0.00) 
-0.29* 
(0.00) 
-
0.27* 
(0.00) 
-
0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.23* 
(0.00) 
0.20* 
(0.00) 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
0.21* 
(0.00) 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
-0.27* 
(0.00) 1    
Information 
disclosure 
0.01 
(0.79) 
-0.25* 
(0.00) 
0.26* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 
0.16* 
(0.00) 
0.46* 
(0.00) 
0.66* 
(0.00) 
0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.53* 
(0.00) 
-0.10* 
(0.00) 
-0.25* 
(0.00) 1   
Enforceme
nt 
-0.20* 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
-
0.15* 
(0.0) 
-
0.24* 
(0.00) 
-0.34* 
(0.00) 
-0.16* 
(0.00) 
-0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.12* 
(0.00) 
0.23* 
(0.00) 
-0.05* 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.35* 
(0.0) 1  
Financial 
reform 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
0.10* 
(0.00) 
0.07* 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.88) 
0.09* 
(0.00) 
0.32* 
(0.00) 
-0.05* 
(0.01) 
-0.13* 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
-0.23* 
(0.00) 
0.38* 
(0.00) 
-0.25* 
(0.00) 1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively 
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Table 2 
Creditor rights, shareholder rights and bond vs. stock market development 
This table reports results for the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978-2011. The dependent variables are, in specifications (1)-(4), 
corporate bond market capitalization and, in (5)-(8), the ratios of total bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. The independent variables proxy 
for creditor and shareholder protection, which are defined in Table A1. The macroeconomic control variables are log of GDP, log of GDP per capita and inflation. 
In all regressions, constant and time dummies are included but are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 Corporate bond market Total bond market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights 0.30*** 029*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.23** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.20* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Revised ADRI -0.20**    -0.58***    
 (0.08)    (0.17)    
Corrected ADRI  -0.07*    -0.22**   
  (0.04)    (0.10)   
Anti-self-dealing   -1.17***    -2.74***  
   (0.36)    (0.76)  
Anti-takeover    -0.72*    -0.65 
    (0.41)    (0.98) 
GDP -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09* -0.27** -0.12 -0.23** -0.23*
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) 
GDP per capita 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) 
Inflation -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Obs. 772 698 772 631 794 720 794 653 
R2 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.03 
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Table 3  
Legal origins, bond covenants and information disclosure, and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results for the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978-2011. The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond 
market capitalization to stock market capitalization. The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection, and we additionally control for 
countries’ legal origin, bond covenant, information disclosure and days of debt contract enforcement. All variables are defined in Table A1. In all specifications, 
macroeconomic control variables are specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Revised ADRI -0.13*    -0.08    
 (0.06)    (0.17)    
Corrected ADRI  -0.08*    -0.07   
  (0.04)    (0.06)   
Anti-self-dealing   -1.08**    -0.81  
   (0.05)    (0.82)  
Anti-takeover    0.31    1.10 
    (0.56)    (0.71) 
English origin -0.86*** -1.05*** -0.59 -1.00*** -0.2** -0.89** -0.53 -1.17***
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.52) (0.37) 
French origin -0.54* -0.53 -0.54* -0.21 -0.46 -0.44 -0.38 -0.16 
 (0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) 
German origin -0.59* -0.33 -0.59* -0.23 -0.47 -0.48 -0.47 -0.13 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.32) (0.35) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) 
 
 
39 
 
Restrictive bond covenant     -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Information disclosure     -0.02 -0.02 -0.-2 -0.02 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Enforcement     0.09 0.10 0.10 0.18 
     (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) 
Obs. 772 698 772 631 576 576 576 494 
R2 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.52 
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Table 4  
Effects of financial reform on corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results for the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978-2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio pf corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection and information disclosure. All 
variables are defined in Table A1. The dummy variable Treated equals 1 if the unit is in the treated group 
and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Post_reform equals 1 if year t is the next year after financial reform 
and 0 otherwise. In all specifications, macroeconomic control variables are specified in Table 2. Year 
dummies and constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Revised ADR -0.18** -0.25**     
 (0.08) (0.11)     
Corrected ADR   -0.17*** 
-
0.18***   
   (0.06) (0.07)   
Anti-self-dealing     -1.23*** 
-
1.27*** 
     (0.35) (0.41) 
Treated 0.37*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.38*** 0.51*** 
*Post-reform (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) 
Information 
disclosure  0.00**  0.00**  0.00** 
* Post-reform  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Obs. 564 470 517 470 564 470 
R2 0.12 0.22 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.31 
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Table 5  
Financial reform, creditor rights, and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results of the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978-2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection and information disclosure. The 
dummy variable Treated equals 1 if the unit is in the treated group and 0 otherwise. The dummy Post_reform 
equals 1 if year t is the next year after financial reform and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 
A1. In all specifications, macroeconomic control variables are specified in Table 2. Year dummies and 
constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Revised ADR -0.20**   -0.30**   
 (0.09)   (0.12)   
Corrected ADR   -0.15**   -0.18**  
  (0.07)   (0.08)  
Anti-self-dealing   -1.12***   
-
1.45*** 
   (0.37)   (0.46) 
Post-reform 0.13 0.08 0.26*** 0.25* 0.03 0.22** 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.11) 
Information disclosure    0.01 0.00) 0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Creditor rights 
*Post-reform 
0.07* 0.06* 0.12***    
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)    
Revised ADRI 
*Post-reform 
-0.03      
(0.04)      
Corrected ADRI 
*Post-reform 
 -0.01     
 (0.05)     
Anti-self-dealing 
*Post-reform   
-
0.69***    
  (0.18)    
Creditor rights 
*Post-reform  
*Information 
disclosure 
   0.00** 0.00* 0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Revised ADRI 
* Post-reform  
*Information 
disclosure 
   -0.00*   
   (0.00)   
Corrected ADR 
*Post-reform  
*Information 
disclosure 
    0.000  
    (0.00)  
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Anti-self-dealing 
*Post-reform  
*Information 
disclosure 
     -0.01*** 
     (0.00) 
Obs. 564 517 564 470 470 470 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.25 
Table 6 
Systematic banking crises and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results of the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978-2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection. The dummy variable Banking crisis 
equals 1 in the year of a systematic banking crisis and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table A1. In 
all specifications, macroeconomic control variables are specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants are 
also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37** 0.36*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) 
Revised ADRI -0.13* -0.13*     
 (0.06) (0.06)     
Corrected ADRI   -0.07 -0.08   
   (0.06) (0.06)   
Anti-self-dealing     -0.86* -0.85** 
     (0.49) (0.43) 
Banking crisis 0.36*** 0.34* 0.41*** 0.40* 0.36*** 0.22* 
 (0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.21) (0.05) (0.12) 
Creditor rights * 
Banking crisis 
 0.00  0.05  0.02 
 (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.05) 
Revised ADRI *  
Banking crisis 
 0.00     
 (0.05)     
Corrected ADRI * 
Banking crisis 
   0.03   
   (0.06)   
Anti-self-dealing * 
Banking crisis 
     -0.39* 
     (0.23) 
Obs. 663 663 589 589 663 663 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
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Table 8  
Banking crises and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results if the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978-2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection. The dummy variable Banking crisis 
equals 1 in the year of a systematic banking crisis and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Region equals 1 if 
the country is an advanced economy in specifications (1)-(2), for the Asian crisis of 1997 in (3)-(4) and for 
the Latin American crisis in (5)-(6) and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table A1. In all 
specifications, macroeconomic control variables are specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants are 
also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
  Advanced East Asian Latin American 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor Rights 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Revised ADRI -0.10*  -0.11  -0.11*  
 (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.06)  
Anti-self-dealing  -0.80*  -0.82*  -0.80* 
  (0.39)  (0.49)  (0.43) 
Region 
*Banking crisis 
2.22** -0.01 0.12 0.07 -0.33 -0.31 
(0.93) (0.71) (0.35) (0.25) (0.34) (0.36) 
Region*Creditor rights 
*Banking crisis 
0.21 0.01 0.42 0.05 0.14 0.18 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) 
Region*Revised ADRI 
*Banking crisis 
-0.55**  -0.02  0.06  
(0.28)  (0.11)  (0.10)  
Region*Anti-self-dealing 
 *Banking crisis 
 1.22  -0.05  0.48 
 (1.72)  (0.56)  (0.86) 
Obs. 663 663 663 663 663 663 
R2 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.22 
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Figure 1 
Relative capitalization of the corporate market to stock market during systemic 
banking crises 
The Y-axis represents the average ratio of private bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization; 
the X-axis represents the years before, during and after banking crises. We assume that banking crises occur 
at year 0; thus, year=-2 represents two years before banking crises, and so forth. The crisis period is covered 
by the shadow boxes. Advanced economies are economies with a GDP per capita over 10,000 USD; East 
Asian economies include seven economies that experienced severe crises from 1997-98. Latin American 
economies include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  
 
  
 
